


# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 12 February 1972*

25X1




*Top Secret*

NSA review completed


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month




NOVEMBER 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972  
Weekly data as reported

**US BATTLE DEATHS** remained the same as last week--2.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS**


increased significantly from last week's 132 to 217. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.



25X1

**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE**


include three regular, [redacted] and four small, special purpose groups totaling 3,703 personnel. The infiltration estimate since 1 October 1971 is now some 77,100 - 79,100.



25X1


**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS**

declined slightly to 174 from the 179 of last week.




**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION**

dropped sharply to 1,105 from last week's 1,305.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS**

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces, continued at the same level for the second consecutive week -- 97%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

[redacted]

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam's Military Regions (MR) 1 and 2 increased noticeably during the past week, but consisted primarily of attacks by fire and sapper activity, with only one action in central Binh Dinh Province qualifying as a major effort. Both MR's 3 and 4 remained relatively quiet with only sporadic attacks by fire and small-scale ground actions occurring. The enemy buildup along the western DMZ and in the western highlands is continuing apace and it now seems certain that major elements of the NVA 320th Division are in or near the tri-border area. There are no clear indications as to when the enemy plans to launch major attacks in MR's 1 and 2. The movement of combat forces and materiel support into these areas, however, appears to have reached the point where the enemy high command can launch major operations at any time.

In Laos, there has been a slight increase in enemy activity in the Long Tieng area, on the Skyline Ridge, and near Sam Thong, where the enemy appears to be preparing for a new attack against the valley base. General Vang Pao's 5,000-man counteroffensive designed to divert enemy forces from the Long Tieng area, and harass enemy lines of communication on the southern edge of the Plaine des Jarres, has, so far, met little enemy resistance. The enemy continues to probe friendly positions north-east of Luang Prabang. Muong Kassy, a key town north of Vientiane on the road to Luang Prabang, was reoccupied by government forces over the weekend. In southern Laos, the enemy has been content to remain in Dong Hene, in the central Panhandle, rather than push west toward the old French garrison town of Seno. Farther south, in the Panhandle, friendly forces have failed to regain their former defensive positions along the road from Pakse to Paksong on the western edge of the Bolovens Plateau.

Enemy-initiated activity in Cambodia during the week was at a low level and consisted mainly of minor harassments and attacks by fire. The recent reinforcement of the Communist's southern command -- COSVN -- with two NVA regiments suggests greater pressure is to be applied to the Kompong Cham area. Alternatively, these units could be a backup for a major Communist thrust by other COSVN elements into South Vietnam's MR 3. A seven-battalion sweep operation south of Route 7 in the Prey Totung area of Kompong Cham is being prepared by the government. This operation, in conjunction with the three-battalion effort currently underway north of Route 7, would represent the largest FANK offensive endeavor in this area since the disastrous CHENLA II operation late last year.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The number of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia rose to an estimated 77,100 - 79,100 with the acceptance of some 3,700 personnel during the week. Recent information discloses that a large portion of the infiltrators moving southward are transporting individual and crew-served weapons, including artillery, which is in marked contrast to the patterns of previous years. The Communists are probably trying this new system for several reasons, including their need to move as many supplies as possible through a logistics network which has been strained ever since the loss of the route through Sihanoukville. Evidence continues to mount that the Communists are preparing for more extensive use of armor and long-range artillery during the upcoming offensive. Tanks have been observed above the DMZ and recent intercepts indicate that some 30 tanks are moving through southern Laos, probably headed toward the western highlands. Additionally, large amounts of artillery ammunition are being moved to both the DMZ and the highlands.

Communist Developments

The long-planned visit to Hanoi of two Japanese Foreign Ministry officials went off on schedule last week. The interests of both Tokyo and Hanoi center on expanding economic and trade relations, and in this regard, the Japanese are reportedly desirous of establishing a trade office in Hanoi. The initial contacts are not likely to lead in the near future to the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations or to any shifts in either country's basic policies on the war.

*Top Secret*